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Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been identified as key drivers of economic 
performance in R&D based growth models, but their impact on development has not been 
fully explored in development accounting exercises. We introduce IPRs to the 
development accounting literature, using Two-Stage Least Squares Bayesian Model 
Averaging (2SBMA) to address endogeneity and model uncertainty at the instrument and 
income stages. We show that IPRs exert similar effects as “Rule of Law,” which has long 
been heralded as a core development determinant in cross country regressions. Our 
results thus provide robust evidence that both dimensions of property rights, physical and 
intellectual, are crucial prerequisites to economic development. Most importantly, we 
document that IPRs which are simply written into law, but are unenforced, exert no effect 
on development. Instead, it is the level of enforced IPRs that causes development. 
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1   Introduction 
Development determinants have long been the focus of cross-country growth regressions, 
which are well known to be subject to substantial model uncertainty (Barro, 1997; 
Durlauf et al., 2005). This model uncertainty manifests itself in the vast number of 
candidate regressors that have been suggested by competing strands of growth and 
development theories. Durlauf et al. (2005) survey no fewer than 140 growth 
determinants for the Handbook of Economic Growth. Therefore it is not surprising that 
prominent approaches to development accounting conduct robustness exercises that 
juxtapose literally dozens of theories and candidate regressors.
2 
Conspicuously absent from this entire literature is, however, one approach that 
includes the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) as a potential development 
determinant.
3 The omission is surprising, given that IPRs are the central driving force of 
economic performance in all R&D based growth models.
4 Property rights over 
innovations guarantee returns for investors, whose inventions constitute the ultimate 
engine for long term development. In sharp contrast, the protection of physical property 
(e.g., capital investment) has long been widely accepted as a core determinant regressor 
in development empirics (as measured by “Rule of Law” or “risk of expropriation”).
5  
  We follow the canonical development determinant approach of Hall and Jones 
(1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Rodrik et al. (2004), and introduce IPRs as an 
additional candidate regressor into this well established line of development regressions. 
Conceptually we could simply add IPRs to each one of the regressions suggested by the 
previous literature and report the IPR significance levels. Raftery (1995) points out, 
however, that significance levels are inflated when coefficients are based on a single 
statistical model whenever the uncertainty surrounding the validity of the particular 
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theory is ignored. Instead, we thus utilize a statistical methodology that allows us to 
introduce IPRs while simultaneously addressing the profound model uncertainty that has 
been highlighted by the vast number of development specifications in the previous 
literature. 
  We analyze the impact of IPRs on development using Bayesian Model Averaging 
(BMA), which is designed to resolve model uncertainty as part of the statistical 
methodology.
6 The added complication that development regressions posit is that their 
model uncertainty is not confined by development determinants, but it is also present at 
the instrument level. Instruments are used to address the endogeneity of development 
determinants and to identify their exact effects on income. Appropriate instruments have 
also been the subject of a voluminous literature comprised of a sizable set of alternative 
theories. Instead of juxtaposing particular instrument specifications in what Rodrik et al. 
(2004) call a “horse race” approach, we employ the Lenkoski et al. (2009) Two-Stage 
Least Squares BMA (2SBMA) procedure to account for model uncertainty at the 
development determinant and instrument levels.  
  To explore the effects of IPRs, we use Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al.’s 
(2004) own data and augment it with Park’s (2008) IPR index. Figure 1 plots the 
dependent variable in Acemoglu et al./Rodrik et al., per capita income, against Park’s 
(2008) IPR index and reveals a clear positive relationship. We are not the first to 
highlight the correlation between the intellectual property rights index and development;
7 
we are, however, the first to address causality and model uncertainty to clarify whether 
better IPRs foster high incomes or whether high levels of development produce excellent 
IPRs.
8  
The 2SBMA methodology addresses the issue of causality by introducing 
instruments that identify the particular effect of IPRs on development. To motivate 
potential instruments for IPRs we follow the law and economics literature, which 
suggests that a particular type of legal origin provides the necessary identification for 
legal institutions today (see La Porta et al. 1998, 1999; Djankov, 2003).  
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  After addressing model uncertainty and causality, we find that IPR protection, 
specifically patent protection, exerts an important impact on development. This impact is 
separate and parallel to the impact of Rule of Law on development. The result highlights 
that both dimensions of property rights protection are crucial development determinants. 
We can also show that the impact of IPRs is causal, as our identification strategy posits 
that IPRs drive income, and our tests of instrument validity support this hypothesis. In 
addition we show that the impact of patent rights on development depends crucially on 
the degree of intellectual property rights enforcement. As long as patent rights are simply 
“on the books” but not enforced, they are shown to exert no effect on development. It is 
the level of enforced patent rights that is positively correlated with development.
9  
The magnitude of the impact of IPR enforcement on development is remarkable: 
increasing enforcement by one standard deviation causes a 42% increase in long term 
development. Coincidentally this effect is just about identical in magnitude as the impact 
of Rule of Law on development. To illustrate the importance of the two dimensions of 
property rights protection, we can consider two countries at either end of the development 
spectrum in 1995: The US, with $27,806 per capita income and Brazil, with $6,820. Our 
results suggest that if Brazil adopted the same level of Rule of Law and IPR enforcement 
as the US, its predicted per capita income would more than triple to $24,323. 
  We are not the first to attempt to resolve endogeneity and identify proximate and 
fundamental development determinants. Alternative approaches to development 
accounting include Mauro (1995), who first suggested ethnolinguistic fragmentation as a 
fundamental determinant of corruption although the subsequent literature focuses on 
“Rule of Law” as a more basic development determinant. Hall and Jones (1999) 
introduced latitude and common language as instruments for an institutional proxy that is 
a composite of trade, corruption and rule of law. We include these candidate instruments 
below and highlight the importance of the latter. La Porta et al. (2004) presented yet 
another "horse race" of theories, juxtaposing judicial independence vs. constitutional 
review; we employ their hypothesis that judicial characteristics matter in order to 
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motivate candidate instruments in our analysis. Lenkoski et al. (2009) apply 2SBMA to 
development determinants, but neglect IPRs. 
  We proceed as follows: Section 2 outlines the statistical approach that underlies 
2SBMA and discusses theoretical properties of the technique, Section 3 describes the 
data, Section 4 discusses the key results and highlights the importance of both 




2.1   The Econometric Approach 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) suggest a particular theory of development, namely that private 
property rights (as measured by government risk of expropriation) are a crucial 
development determinant, and that the security of such property rights is crucially 
dependent on the type of colonial history a country experienced. Rodrik et al. (2004) 
broaden the definition of development determinants and conduct an all out "horse race" 
of three potential determinants (private property rights, trade, and geography) against a 
host of alternative theories. Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. 2004 constitute the 
most rigorous robustness tests that have been conducted; the studies employ the largest 
set of potential development theories to justify and juxtapose candidate regressors.  
  Both studies acknowledge that the effects of proximate development determinants 
are endogenous and apply the 2SLS instrumental variable technique to identify the 
specific effect that each determinant exerts on development. A complicating factor is, 
however, that competing theories suggest alternative sets of different instruments. 
Acemoglu et al. and Rodrik et al. approach this issue by juxtaposing not only theories of 
development determinants, but also theories that motivate alternative instruments against 
another. Profound model uncertainty thus contaminates coefficient estimates at both the 
instrument and the determinant level. To examine the effects of IPRs on development we 
adopt the Acemoglu et al. and Rodrik et al. approach and data augmented by Park’s IPR 
index.  6   
 
 
2.2   Statistical Foundations  
Instead of producing numerous robustness regressions, we resolve the model uncertainty 
using a statistical methodology that was specifically designed for that task, Two-Stage 
Least Squares Bayesian Model Averaging (2SBMA). 2SBMA combines the instrumental 
variable and BMA methodologies to process the data like a two stage estimator, while 
addressing model uncertainty in both stages. It is a nested approach that first determines 
the posterior model probabilities in the first stage via straight BMA to ascertain whether 
any instruments receive support from the data. Then 2SBMA model averages using the 
fitted values to derive second stage posterior model probabilities, means, and standard 
deviations. The weight of each model in the second stage depends not only on its 
performance, but also on the performance of the particular set of instruments that gave 
rise to the particular second stage model.  
  In addition to resolving model uncertainty, Bayesian model averaging minimizes 
the sum of Type I and Type II error, the mean squared error, and generates predictive 
distributions with optimal predictive performance (Raftery and Zheng, 2003). 2SBMA is 
also consistent and it reduces the many instrument bias that is especially relevant in 
approaches that juxtapose a number of alternative candidate regressors (Lenkoski et al., 
2009). Below we provide a sketch of the 2SBMA methodology, limiting our discussion to 
the properties relevant to our application and refer the interested reader to the 
comprehensive tutorial and derivations by Raftery et al. (1997) and Lenkoski et al. (2009) 
for further discussion. 
  The standard approach to addressing endogeneity of development determinants is 
to apply two-stage least squares (2SLS) and impose over-identification and instrument 
restrictions according to  
         
p
j j jX Y
1    ,     (1) 
in which Y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of candidate regressors which is 
comprised of a vector of W endogenous and D exogenous variables. Reverse causality is 
of utmost interest in development regressions. Are countries rich because they have good 7   
 
 
institutions or property rights, or are property rights strong in countries that are 
sufficiently wealthy to maintain them? 
  In the presence of endogeneity, the determination of W leads to inconsistent 
estimates of the entire coefficient in (1). The 2SLS estimator solves the consistency 
problem, but relies on the existence of a set of instruments, Z, which are independent of 
Y, given the vector of covariates X. To identify the effect of W on Y, the researcher must 
suggest a set of instruments, Z such that  
             D Z W D Z .       (2)   
The IV estimates derived in a second stage by using the fitted values from the first stage 
(2) are consistent only if the conditional independence assumptions are valid. Theories 
seldom present clear-cut instruments that have both strong explanatory power on the 
endogenous variables and unquestionable conditional independence properties in relation 
to the dependent variable. Over-identification tests such as the one proposed by Sargan 
(1958) help verify the validity of the instrument assumptions. 
  The 2SBMA setup can be concisely summarized as follows. Let  be a quantity 
of interest and M the set of potential models that is comprised of I individual models in 
the first stage. The posterior distribution of  given the data, D, is given by the weighted 
average of the predictive distribution under each model,  
             
I
i i i D M pr D pr
1 , | |      (3) 
in which  D M pr i, |   is the predictive distribution and the model weight is  
          i i i i i i i M d M D pr D M pr          , | | .     (4) 
The model weight is thus comprised of the posterior probability for model Mi and the 
prior densities for parameters and models,    i    and   i M  , respectively. Intuitively, 
this implies that a model’s weight is proportional to its relative efficiency in describing 
the data.  
  Posterior model probabilities are also the weights used to establish the posterior 
means and variances  8   
 
 
      
I
M i i i
BMA    ˆ ˆ ,       ( 5 )  






M i i i
BMA 2 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ       .    (6) 
The BMA posterior mean is thus the weighted sum of all posterior means, where the 
weight is the quality of the model that generated a particular coefficient. The posterior 
variance is the sum of the weighted variance for each model plus a second term that 
indicates how much the estimates differ across models. To provide economically 
meaningful coefficient estimates we condition the posterior mean and variance on 
whether a regressor is included in the model. By summing the posterior model 
probabilities over all models that include a candidate regressor, we obtain the posterior 
inclusion probability 
         
M i i i D pr   | 0 ˆ .     (7) 
The posterior inclusion probability of a regressor is the probability that a variable is 
included in the true model. It provides a probability statement regarding the importance 
of a regressor that directly addresses the researchers’ prime concern: what is the 
probability that the coefficient has a non-zero effect on the dependent variable? The 
posterior inclusion probability thus also carries an important interpretation that goes 
beyond the information contained in standard p-values.   
General rules developed by Jefferies (1961) and refined by Kass and Raftery 
(1995) stipulate effect-thresholds for posterior probabilities. Posterior probabilities < 50% 
are seen as evidence against an effect, and the evidence for an effect is either weak, 
positive, strong, or decisive for posterior probabilities ranging from 50-75%, 75-95%, 95-
99%, and > 99%, respectively. In our analysis, we refer to a regressor as “effective” if its 
posterior inclusion probability exceeds 50%. 
  To address endogeneity, 2SBMA first determines the posterior model 
probabilities as outlined above as well as the first stage fitted values,  i w ~ , for each model 
Mi. Denoting the set of j second stage models as L, 2SBMA then uses the fitted values to 9   
 
 
derive second stage posterior probabilities and estimates,    i j w ~   and   i j w ~ ˆ   to obtain the 
posterior mean 
           
I
M i i j i
J
L j i j
SLSBMA w w ~ ˆ ~ ˆ 2    
 .   (8) 
The posterior mean consists of the combination of weighted fitted values from the first 
stage models and the weighted posteriors means of the second stage models. The model 
weight, or the quality of the first stage instrumentation thus influences the overall model 
weight of a second stage coefficient. The posterior variance and inclusion probability are 
then  












L j j j j
J
L j j i
SLSBMA 2 2 2 2 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ            (9) 
          
M i i L j j j D pr   
 | 0 ˆ ,      ( 1 0 )  
in which   is the model averaged estimate for a given first stage model, Mi. The 
2SBMA variance has a similar interpretation as the BMA variances. The first term is the 
average of BMA variances associated with the first stage models, and the second term 
represents the variation of a given first stage model's BMA estimates relative to the 
overall 2SBMA estimate. 
 
3 Data   
Our data was collected from four major sources. Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide data on 
settler mortality and religion, Park (2008) provides the IPR index, which is in fact an 
index of patent protection, and La Porta et al. (1998) provide data on the legal origins of a 
country. All other variables suggested in the comprehensive robustness approach are 
obtained from Rodrik et al. (2004).  Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) sample covers 64 countries, 
but the combination with IPR data limits our sample to 54 observations. 
Table 1 provides the key descriptive statistics for all variables. For example, GDP 
per capita ranges from $519 (Tanzania) to $27,806 (US) with a mean of $4,825, and Rule 
of Law ranges from 1.71 (New Zealand) to -1.49 (Angola), with a mean of -0.28. Park’s 10   
 
 
patent index is the sum of five equally weighted sub-indices (patent length, scope, 
enforcement, the protection from loss of patent rights and membership in patent 
treaties).
10 It evaluates the strength of a country’s patent system on a scale of 0 (poor 
patent system) to 5 (strong patent system) with US (4.48) being the strongest and Angola 
(0.0) the weakest. Patent enforcement is measured on a scale of 0 to 1 scale where 1 is 
obtained if a country has all of the following enforcement mechanisms: preliminary 
injunctions, contributory infringement pleadings and burden-of-proof reversals.  
To identify the effect of physical and intellectual property rights on development 
requires instruments that influence property rights directly but are unlikely to impact the 
income level in 1995 directly. To identify the security of physical property rights, 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) propose settler mortality, which indicates whether a country was a 
settlement or extraction colony. Countries with the latter history are presumed to have 
adopted weaker property rights institutions. Alternative instruments for physical property 
rights are the fractions of the English or European language speaking population in a 
country (Hall and Jones, 1999), which are hypothesized to serve as measures of the 
colonial powers’ commitment to building good property rights institutions.  
  To introduce IPRs, we are required to propose additional instruments, and we rely 
on a country’s type of legal origin. Specifically we follow the law and economics 
literature, which suggests either English common law or Roman (in particular French) 
civil law (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999) legal origins to have a profound impact on how 
intellectual property rights are considered by today’s legal system. David and Brierley 
(1985) show that corporate law and commercial laws vary systematically by legal origin, 
and that French legal origins (civil law) are associated with greater formalism of judicial 
procedures (Djankov et al. 2003) and less judicial independence (La Porta et al. 2004). 
The latter has been associated with better contract enforcement and greater security of 
property rights. Since the legal traditions were typically introduced into various countries 
through conquest and colonization, they are considered largely exogenous, which 
qualifies them as strong candidate instruments. The remaining variables included in our 
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estimation are candidate regressors that have been previously argued to exert an effect on 
development and that were included in Rodrik et al.’s (2004) robustness checks. 
 
4   Quantifying the Effects of IPRs on Development 
This section reports the results of the 2SBMA estimation that introduces IPRs to the 
canonical development regressions by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) 
and resolves model uncertainty as part of the statistical procedure. We commence with 
the results for the aggregate patent index. Columns 2-4 and 5-6 in Table 2 reveal that our 
instrument strategy provides two effective instruments for patents (fraction of English 
speaking population in a country and French legal origin) and that physical property 
rights are also well identified. The Bayesian Sargan test (see Lenkoski et al., 2009) 
confirms that the exogeneity condition is fulfilled and the instruments are not correlated 
with the error term in the equation of interest. In other words, the legal and colonial 
history instrument regressors do exert an effect on development, but not directly, only 
indirectly through their impact on IPRs. We can thus be confident that the endogeneity of 
IPRs has been addressed successfully and are able to discuss causal effects of IPRs on 
development.  
  The impact of the aggregate patent index on development is, however, 
disappointing: The aggregate patent index does not surpass the effectiveness threshold. 
Instead, “Rule of Law” and geographic variables, such as tropics, malaria, and the South-
East Asia dummy show inclusion probabilities that are significantly larger than 50%. One 
hypothesis could be that the weak effect of the aggregate patent index reflects the sizable 
number of developing countries that achieve high marks for the breadth of their patent 
laws, but whose intellectual property rights laws are not well enforced.  
  By disaggregating the patent index, we can find that the average patent duration is 
largely identical for developing and developed countries. In contrast, a number of 
developing countries exhibit a dismal score for the enforcement of their stringent patent 
rights. With an average patent enforcement index of 0.11, developing countries’ 
enforcement mechanisms are almost eight times weaker than the average protection 
afforded by developed economies.  12   
 
 
  To test our hypothesis formally, we replace the aggregate patent index by the 
patent  enforcement index and reestimate the above specification. With three valid 
instruments (settler mortality, fraction of population speaking English, and French legal 
origin), patent enforcement is well identified. The result of the Sargan test confirms the 
exogeneity of the instruments, which allows us to discuss causal results. Table 3 reports 
strong positive effects of the enforcement of intellectual property rights on development. 
Given the coefficient estimates in column 9, we find that a one standard deviation 
increase in patent enforcement increases income by 42.0%. This magnitude is impressive 
given that a one standard deviation increase in “Rule of Law”, the key regressor in the 
previous literature, increases income by a similar magnitude (by 41.7%). This result 
strongly suggests that both dimensions of property protection, physical and intellectual, 
are crucial for development.
11 
To illustrate the impact of these two dimensions, consider two examples: 1995 per 
capita income in the US has been about 4.3 times higher than in Venezuela. Our results 
suggest that if Venezuela adopted the degree of intellectual property rights enforcement 
and the level of Rule of Law to match the levels in the US, the income difference 
between the two countries would only be about 11%. Our other example compares the 
US and India. In 1995 US per capita income was about 14 times greater than India’s. If 
India adopted US intellectual and physical property rights, the predicted result would be a 
tenfold reduction in the income differences between the two countries.  
Apart from highlighting the impact of the two dimensions of property protection 
on development, our results also emphasize the importance of accounting for model 
uncertainty at both the instrument and income stages. The approach allows us to augment 
the findings by Rodrik (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). Our approach discovers, for 
example, additional income determinants: While Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) find at best weak direct evidence of geography on development we find strong 
effects for geographic variables that influence the level of development (e.g., Latin 
                                                 
11Our results are robust to the inclusion of alternative measures of IPRs and IPR enforcement. In 
regressions that are available from the authors, we introduce sub-indices for duration, coverage and 
protection from loss of rights. None of these indices changed our results or surpassed effective thresholds.  13   
 
 
America, East Asia, tropics, and malaria).
12 These results are consistent with the results 
obtained by Lenkoski et al. (2009) who account for model uncertainty by using 2SBMA. 
In line with the results by Rodrik et al. (2004), we also find that trade does not surpass the 
effectiveness threshold. Our first stage results confirm those of Lenkoski (2009) and 
Albouy (forthcoming, AER) in that settler mortality is not an effective instrument for 
Rule of Law in contrast to the findings of Rodrik (2004) and Acemoglu (2001). However, 
we do find that settler mortality serves as a strong instrument for the intellectual property 
dimension of institutions as its inclusion probability for patent enforcement is almost 
90%. All other results conform to Lenkoski et al. (2009), Rodrik et al. (2004), and Hall 
and Jones (1999) in that common language variables are shown to be excellent 
instruments for institutions. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The literature that attempts to isolate development determinants has long focused on the 
effects of physical property rights protection as a key determinant of the observed 
differences in per capita incomes. Rule of Law (Rodrik et al., 2004) or Risk of 
Government Expropriation (Acemoglu et al., 2001) had previously been identified as 
crucial institutional development determinants. Theoretical models of development also 
highlight, however, the importance of intellectual property rights, which we introduce to 
the development empirics literature in our paper.   
  Cross-country growth and development regressions are well known to suffer from 
substantial model uncertainty, and numerous candidate regressors and theories have been 
proposed by the voluminous literature in outright “horse races” (Rodrik et al., 2004; La 
Porta et al., 2004). Not only is the uncertainty about development determinants 
substantial, but theories which suggest instruments to resolve endogeneity are equally 
abundant. In this paper, while introducing IPRs into the cross country development 
literature, we account for endogeneity of the development determinants and address 
                                                 
12 Kourtellos et al. (2010) previously challenged Rodrik et al.’s (2004) results on the basis of parameter 
heterogeneity.  14   
 
 
model uncertainty at the income determinant and instrument levels using Two-Stage 
Least Square Bayesian Model Averaging (2SBMA). 
  We find that intellectual property rights exert a strong impact on development if 
they are properly enforced. The important insight is thus that both intellectual and 
physical property rights are crucial determinants of cross-county income differences. 
Interestingly, our results suggest that the two dimensions of property rights protection 
hold equally strong explanatory power: a one standard deviation increase in “Rule of 
Law” increases per capita income by 42%, and this effect is identical to the impact of a 
one standard deviation increase in patent enforcement, which is also estimated to raise 
per capita income by the same amount.  In line with previous studies, we also find 
evidence for an effect of geographical variables (as malaria and tropics) on development. 
We conclude from the data that the effective protection of both physical and intellectual 
property rights, along with geography, are the key determinants of a country’s economic 





















































































 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources 
Variable Max  Min Mean  StDev  meaning,  source 
lcgdp95  10.23  6.25 7.99 0.97  natural log of GDP per capita in PPP in 1995, RST (2004), orig.: PWT, Mark 6. 
gdp95  27806.08 519.00  4824.67 5659.47  GDP per capita in 1995, same as above 
rule  1.71 -1.49 -0.28 0.80  Rule of Law, RST (2004), originally: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) 
logem4  7.99 2.15 4.79 1.19  Settler Mortality, AJR (2001) 
logfrankrom  3.74 0.94 2.49 0.63  natural log of predicted trade shares, RST (2004), originally: Frankel and Romer (1999) 
engfrac  0.95 0.00 0.08 0.22  Fraction of population speaking English, RST (2004), originally: Hall and Jones (1999) 
eurfrac  1.00 0.00 0.32 0.41 
Fraction of population speaking English, French, German, Portuguese or Spanish, RST 
(2004), orig.: Hall and Jones (1999) 
legor_fr  1.00 0.00 0.68 0.46  1 if origins of the legal system are French, La Porta et al. (1998) 
disteq  45.00 0.00 15.82  12.03  Distance from Equator, RST (2004) 
laam  1.00 0.00 0.34 0.47  1 if country belongs to Latin America or the Caribbean, RST (2004) 
safrica  1.00 0.00 0.41 0.49  1 if country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa, RST (2004) 
catho80  96.60 0.10 44.23  37.42  1 if population is predominantly Catholic, AJR (2001) 
muslim80  99.40 0.00 23.95  33.75  1 if population is predominantly Muslim, AJR (2001) 
protmg80  58.40 0.00 11.04  13.99  1 if population is predominantly Protestant, AJR (2001) 
tropics  1.00 0.00 0.73 0.41  percentage of tropical land area, RST (2004), orig.: Gallup and Sachs (1998) 
access  1.00 0.00 0.18 0.37  1 for countries without access to the sea, RST (2004) 
oil  1.00 0.00 0.11 0.29  1 if country is major oil exporter, RST (2004) 
frstarea  1.00 0.00 0.17 0.29 
Proportion of land with >5 frost-days/month in winter, RST (2004), orig.: Masters and 
McMillan (2001) 
frstdays  29.68  0.02 3.42 5.91  Av. number of frost-days/month in winter, RST (2004), orig.: Masters and McMillan (2001) 
malfal94  1.00 0.00 0.44 0.44  Malaria index for 1994, RST (2004), originally: Gallup and Sachs (1998) 
meantemp  29.30 -0.20 22.70 5.09  Average temperature in Celsius, RST (2004) 
lcopen  4.64 2.55 3.76 0.47  natural log of nominal openness, RST (2004), originally: PWT, Mark 6. 
asiae  1.00 0.00 0.07 0.23  1 if country belongs to South-East Asia, RST (2004) 
pat_1990  4.68 0.00 1.74 0.81  Patent index (0-5 scale, zero=weak, 1=strong), Park (2008) 
enf_1990  1.00  0.00 0.17 0.26  Patent enforcement index (0=weak, 1=strong), Park (2008) Table 2: Instrumented Effects of Property Rights on Development 




















INSTRUMENTS                      
Engl Lang Frac  100.0  1.807  0.536 9.3  0.839  0.531         
French Legal Orig  55.6  -0.424 0.206  11.8 0.203 0.160         
Euro Lang Frac  1.7 -0.633 0.458  98.7  1.298 0.294         
Implied Trade Share  26.8  0.240  0.148  3.5  0.110  0.139        
Settler Mortality  8.4  -0.144  0.118 8.1  0.095  0.077         
DEVELOPMENT DETERMINANTS                  
South-East Asia                84.9  1.043 0.472 
Rule of Law                80.7  0.702 0.260 
Malaria 1994                75.9  -0.716 0.307 
Oil                70.1  0.572 0.277 
Tropics                58.0  -0.592 0.325 
Muslim                56.3  -0.006 0.003 
Sub-Saharan Africa                51.7  -0.585 0.318 
Catholic                47.4  0.008  0.004 
Trade                    34.1  0.252  0.192 
Patent Protection                29.4  0.285  0.390 
Latin America                18.4  0.433  0.394 
No Sea Access                13.3  -0.233  0.210 
Distance Equator                12.2  -0.016  0.016 
Mean Temperature                8.8  -0.012  0.034 
Frost Area                6.9  0.351  0.417 
Frost  Days                4.0  0.006  0.026 
Protestant                0.9  -0.001  0.008 
Bayes Sargan P-value              0.59     
 
Table 3: Instrumented Effects of Patent Enforcement on Development 





















                       
Engl Lang Frac  100.0  0.647 0.162  9.3 0.839 0.531           
Settler Mortality  89.5  -0.081 0.033  8.1  -0.095 0.077           
French Legal Orig  51.5  -0.114 0.060  11.8  -0.203 0.160           
Euro Lang Frac  21.5 0.143  0.088  98.7  1.298  0.294         
Impl. Trade Share  0.4  -0.042  0.042  3.5  -0.110  0.139         
DEVELOPMENT DETERMINANTS                   
South-East Asia                90.9  0.987 0.317 
Oil                75.6  0.566 0.257 
Patent Enforcement               78.9  1.600 0.704 
Malaria 1994                75.1  -0.603 0.267 
Tropics                65.5  -0.591 0.295 
Rule of Law                61.2  0.524 0.284 
Latin America                51.8  0.658 0.314 
Catholic                38.2  0.008  0.003 
Trade              31.8  0.257  0.170 
Sub-Saharan Africa                22.2  -0.544  0.345 
Mean Temperature                18.9  -0.026  0.029 
Muslim                17.5  -0.005  0.003 
No Sea Access                13.5  -0.237  0.186 
Frost Area                7.8  0.490  0.389 
Distance Equator                7.5  -0.013  0.015 
Frost Days             6.9  0.020  0.020 
Protestant                0.5  -0.003  0.007 
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